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Abstract 
The formal reconciliation process in Australia was conducted between 1991 and 2000 and aimed to reconcile 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples by 2001. In this paper, I detail the failure of both this reconciliation 
process and governments, in particular the Howard Government, to recognise Indigenous rights, such as 
sovereignty, a treaty, self-determination and land rights.  
 
 
 
In 1991, the Australian Commonwealth Parliament unanimously passed the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 which instituted a ten-year formal process of 
reconciliation. The aim of this process was to reconcile Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples by the centenary of Australia’s federation in 2001. The process was facilitated and 
promoted by the government-initiated Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR).  
 
During the reconciliation decade, many Indigenous political leaders, involved in key 
Indigenous organisations, such as CAR or the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC), and who were mostly men, consistently and clearly advocated that a 
range of Indigenous rights needed to be genuinely recognised by the reconciliation process 
and governments. These rights included sovereignty, self-determination, land rights, 
intellectual and cultural rights, parliamentary representation and a treaty. In this paper, I 
detail this history of political demands for Indigenous rights by Indigenous leaders between 
1991 and 2000. I argue that these demands, despite their consistency and clarity, were largely 
not addressed by the conclusion of the reconciliation process, either by several key 
documents published by CAR in 2000, in particular the Documents of Reconciliation, or by 
Australian governments.   
 
Early in the reconciliation process, many Indigenous leaders were very sceptical of the 
concept of reconciliation and saw the process as a stalling tactic by the Hawke Government 
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to avoid discussions of Indigenous rights, such as a treaty and sovereignty. Kevin Gilbert, 
poet and author, at a ‘Day of Protest and Mourning’ at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, held on 
the 27 May 1992, argued: 
 
We have seen the Australian Government and the Australian people try to get 
off the hook of responsibility by saying, ten years down the track, we’ll have 
Reconciliation. And Reconciliation doesn’t promise us human rights, it 
doesn’t promise us our Sovereign rights or the platform from which to 
negotiate, and it doesn’t promise us a viable land base … It is ten more years 
of death! (cited in Attwood & Markus 1999, pp.321-322) 
 
Bundjalung elder Reverend Frank Roberts, was likewise very critical of the concept of 
reconciliation. He wrote that a meeting of the Far North Coast NSW Aboriginal Elders 
Council: 
 
rejected outright the concept of reconciliation at this point in time, believing it 
is mistimed and premature and would put unborn Aboriginal people in 
jeopardy. It would only be a token gesture …. To even contemplate 
reconciliation now would be an act of betrayal. If we reject reconciliation, then 
a treaty is a must (Roberts 1992, p.5). 
 
Other Indigenous leaders also expressed reservations about the reconciliation process. Paul 
Coe, from the NSW Aboriginal Legal Service, stated, ‘why should justice for Aboriginal 
people be delayed till the oppressor is “enlightened” in its attitudes?’ (cited in Duke 1992, 
p.6). Charles Harris, a retired minister and activist, contended that the initial step in the 
reconciliation process must be the addressing of ‘the just demands of the people. Land rights, 
sovereignty, etc. must be dealt with’ (cited in Wilson 1991, p. 13). In 1994, Michael Mansell, 
an Indigenous activist and a strong advocate for Indigenous sovereignty, argued that in its 
first few years, the reconciliation process had not shown a desire to work towards changing 
power relations (Mansell 1994, p.15).  
 
The Chairperson of CAR from 1991 to 1997 and the person regarded as the ‘Father of 
Reconciliation’, Pat Dodson, similarly advocated the importance of Indigenous rights. Early 
on in the reconciliation process, Dodson stated that the reconciliation process needed to 
implement a document of reconciliation and to consider a broad range of issues, including 
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sovereignty, constitutional change, Indigenous rights and ‘power sharing’ (Dodson 1992a, 
pp.9-11; see Mudrooroo 1995, p.233).  
 
Some non-Indigenous people, who supported Indigenous rights, were likewise not initially 
supportive of reconciliation. For example, author Judith Wright, a key member of the 
Aboriginal Treaty Committee, wrote that reconciliation was a ‘mischievous attempt to fool 
the rest of the world into thinking something constructive is being attempted’ (Wright 1992, 
cited in Roberts 1993, p.16). Historian Henry Reynolds saw it as a public relations strategy 
after the policy failures of the 1980s:  
 
it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the process of reconciliation is being 
pursued because the government must be seen to be doing something, having 
abandoned the pre-1983 commitment to national land rights legislation and 
having edged gingerly away from the concept of a treaty promised by the 
prime minister at Barunga in 1988 (Reynolds 1991, p. 3). 
 
A prominent non-Indigenous ex-public servant and another key member of the Aboriginal 
Treaty Committee, H. C. Coombs, contended that CAR was not effective in developing 
reconciliation as  
 
it is not achieving results from the Aboriginal community. They do not, in my 
view, identify with the process: they are looking for evidence that there is a 
genuine commitment on the part of the government and on the part of the 
white Australian community to accept their right to autonomy (cited in Walker 
1994, p.14).  
 
The reactions from some Indigenous leaders to the High Court’s 1992 judgement in Mabo 
and Others v Queensland (No 2) also illustrated the importance that many Indigenous people 
place upon the recognition of Indigenous rights. Although the Mabo judgement recognised 
the legal fiction of terra nullius and the continuing, albeit severely diminished, existence of 
Indigenous native title, it reinforced the rights of the Crown. In a previous judgement, the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Case 1975, the High Court decided: ‘The acquisition of territory 
by a sovereign state for the first time is an act of state which cannot be challenged, controlled 
or interfered with by the courts of that State’ ((1975) 135 CLR 337, 388). Brennan J (with 
Mason CJ and McHugh J concurring) supported this position in the Mabo judgement when he 
stated: ‘The Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over the several parts of Australia cannot be 
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challenged in an Australian municipal court’ ((1992) 66 ALJR 453). Incidentally, this 
position of the High Court was not addressed by the Keating Government’s Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth). 
 
This aspect of the Mabo judgement was heavily criticised by Michael Mansell who argued 
that the judgement undermined Indigenous people’s campaigns for the recognition of their 
sovereignty.  
 
The Court was silent on the equally unjust use of the doctrine [of terra nullius] 
to deny sovereignty. The Court refused to follow precedent on the issue of 
terra nullius for to do so would be to maintain a legal fiction based on political 
convenience. Yet the very same convenience was relied on by the Judges to 
shut the door to any Aboriginal hopes for arguing Aboriginal sovereignty in 
the Courts (Mansell 1993, pp.4-5; see Reynolds 1998, p.209; Mansell 1992, 
pp.36-37).  
 
Other prominent Indigenous leaders, such as Noel Pearson, Executive Director of the Cape 
York Land Council, and magistrate Pat O’Shane, expressed concerns as well regarding the 
limitations of the Mabo decision (Pearson 1994, p.75; O’Shane 1994, p.29). The failure of the 
High Court to address sovereignty was further criticised by non-Indigenous historian Henry 
Reynolds. Reynolds stated that, ‘while the courts demolished the concept of terra nullius in 
respect of property, it preserved it in relation to sovereignty … [which] lines Australian law 
up with the international lawyers writing at the high noon of imperialism’ (Reynolds 1996, 
pp.3, 13).  
 
On 3 June 1999, CAR released its Draft Document for Reconciliation. This contained the 
Draft Declaration for Reconciliation and the National Strategies to Advance Reconciliation. 
CAR wrote that it would consult with the wider Australian community about their Draft 
Document for Reconciliation and would incorporate feedback into a final document for 
reconciliation that would be presented to the Australian public in May 2000 (CAR 1999, p.4).  
 
Many Indigenous leaders were concerned at the failure of the Draft Document for 
Reconciliation to specifically mention Indigenous rights, such as sovereignty and a treaty. 
Geoff Clark, then Chairperson of ATSIC, argued that any document of reconciliation should 
be a formal agreement between Indigenous people and Commonwealth and State 
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governments that should address several key issues, including: the structural relationship 
between Indigenous people and the Australian state; self-determination; land issues; stolen 
generations (including an apology and compensation); protection from racial discrimination; 
customary law; the provision of an independent economic base for Indigenous people; and a 
treaty (Clark 2000a, p.233). Similarly, Pat Dodson wrote that there needed to be a ‘formal 
document that recognises and guarantees the rights of indigenous Australians within the 
Australian Constitution’ and that this document would ‘provide substantial reconciliation’ by 
addressing: equal human rights and specific Indigenous rights; rights of Indigenous people to 
maintain their distinct characteristics, identities, laws, cultures, spiritual traditions and 
languages; the right of Indigenous self-determination; Indigenous control over economic and 
social development; Indigenous ownership of land and resources and just compensation for 
land that cannot be returned; the right of Indigenous self-government; constitutional 
recognition; and the enacting of treaties (Dodson 2000, pp.269, 270-273). In 1999, Gatjil 
Djerrkura, then Chairperson of ATSIC, expressed his concerns with the Draft Document for 
Reconciliation. 
 
I am pessimistic about the prospects of any document which fails squarely to 
recognise the principle of self-determination gaining support amongst indigenous 
constituencies. Further, a significant proportion of Aboriginal people in my 
country continue to assert our unextinguished sovereignty. It is reasonably clear 
that indigenous people will not agree to any document or documents of 
reconciliation which compromise these assertions of sovereignty … indigenous 
Australians are unlikely to conclude that the Draft Declaration represents an 
accurate reflection of our actual aspirations and entitlements (Djerrkura 1999, 
pp.6-7). 
 
This concern that any final document of reconciliation should incorporate Indigenous rights, 
such as sovereignty and a treaty, was again demonstrated following the release by the 
Howard Government of the proposed Constitutional Preamble as part of the November 6 
1999 Constitutional Referendum. While CAR saw this proposed Preamble as one possibility 
for a document of reconciliation and ‘a definite step forward for reconciliation’ (CAR 1997, 
p. 4; Scott 1999, p. 17), many Indigenous leaders argued that the Preamble ‘fails to recognise 
the inherent and distinct rights of the first nations which have been recognised by the High 
Court’ (Agius et al. 1999, p. 15; see Mansell 1999, p. 18). A meeting of a number of 
Indigenous leaders unanimously recommended that the ‘question on the draft preamble to the 
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Australian Constitution should be dropped from the forthcoming Republic referendum’ 
(Agius et al. 1999, p.15). One of the participants at this meeting, Pat Dodson, later wrote that  
 
all Australians should reject any preamble to our national Constitution that denies 
the true status of indigenous Australians as the custodians and owners of the land, 
and suggests that we are nothing more than gardeners at the station homestead 
(Dodson 2000, p.270). 
 
Just prior to the release of CAR’s final document of reconciliation, there were two more 
significant instances of Indigenous leaders arguing that Indigenous rights should form part of 
a reconciliation agenda. On 12 May 2000, Pat Dodson stated that CAR should recommend to 
the Commonwealth Government that a treaty be developed between Indigenous people and 
the Commonwealth Government (Dodson 2000b, pp.20-21). Dodson contended the treaty 
should be based on a number of core principles, including: ‘political representation, 
reparations and compensation, regional agreements, Indigenous regional self-government, 
cultural and intellectual property rights, recognition of customary law and an economic base’ 
(Dodson 2000b, p.19). On May 25 2000, four Indigenous leaders, Geoff Clark, Aden 
Ridgeway, David Ross and Pat Dodson, with Bill Jonas as an observer, met with Prime 
Minister John Howard in an attempt to place a number of issues on a post-document 
reconciliation agenda. These issues included the development of a treaty, the reservation of 
parliamentary seats for Indigenous people, self-determination, compensation, self-
government and customary law (Saunders & Shanahan 2000, p.5; Saunders 2000, p.1). It was 
‘the most ambitious plan put to the Prime Minister by Aborigines – imposing a deadline for 
the enactment of legislation and mentioning government funds to facilitate negotiations’ 
(Saunders 2000, p.1). 
 
At the conclusion of their nine-month consultation process concerning the Draft Document 
for Reconciliation, CAR developed their final document of reconciliation. To commemorate 
the occasion, a two-day event entitled Corroboree 2000 was held from 27 to 28 May 2000 at 
the Sydney Opera House. On the first day of Corroboree 2000, CAR unveiled their 
Documents for Reconciliation to the Australian community, which consisted of the 
Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation and the Roadmap for Reconciliation. These 
documents contained no substantive recognition of Indigenous rights. In fact Pat Dodson 
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boycotted Corroboree 2000 in protest at CAR’s ‘grossly inadequate’ documents of 
reconciliation (Gordon 2001, p.100; Gordon 2000, p.1). 
 
CAR intended the Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation to be an ‘aspirational 
statement’ that would be embraced by both non-Indigenous and Indigenous people (CAR 
2000a, p.71). The wording of this final version was:  
 
Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation 
We, the peoples of Australia, of many origins as we are, make a commitment to 
go on together in a spirit of reconciliation. 
We value the unique status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the 
original owners and custodians of lands and waters.  
We recognise this land and its waters were settled as colonies without treaty or 
consent. 
Reaffirming the human rights of all Australians, we respect and recognise 
continuing customary laws, beliefs and traditions.  
Through understanding the spiritual relationship between the land and its first 
peoples, we share our future and live in harmony.  
Our nation must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the wounds of its past 
so that we can move on together at peace with ourselves. 
Reconciliation must live in the hearts and minds of all Australians. Many steps 
have been taken, many steps remain as we learn our shared histories.  
As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and 
expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other 
part accepts the apologies and forgives.  
We desire a future where all Australians enjoy their rights, accept their 
responsibilities, and have the opportunity to achieve their full potential.  
And so, we pledge ourselves to stop injustice, overcome disadvantage, and 
respect that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have the right to self-
determination within the life of the nation.  
Our hope is for a united Australia that respects this land of ours; values the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and provides justice and equity for 
all (CAR 2000c, p.3). 
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The Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation failed to address many of the arguments 
raised by a number of Indigenous leaders, including Dodson, Clark and Djerrkura, following 
the release of the Draft Document for Reconciliation. It contained no substantive 
commitments to address Indigenous rights, including land rights, a treaty or sovereignty 
(Nettheim 2000, p.63). The Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation was a nationalist 
document, containing phrases such as ‘we, the peoples of Australia’, ‘go on together’, ‘we 
share our future and live in harmony’, ‘move on together’ and ‘united Australia’ (CAR 
2000c, p.3). Also, while the term ‘self-determination’ was used in the Australian Declaration 
towards Reconciliation, it was linked with the phrase ‘within the life of the nation’ (CAR 
2000c, p.3). As Monk outlined, the term ‘self-determination, whilst upheld in the Declaration 
Towards Reconciliation, was not part of the process of arriving at a document, and has 
largely been included as a political catch-phrase’ (Monk 2001, p.22). Lastly, the Australian 
Declaration towards Reconciliation contained a conditional apology. Rather than 
unambiguously and unconditionally offering an apology to Indigenous people, it merely 
stated that as ‘one part’ of the nation apologises, another ‘part accepts the apologies and 
forgives’ (CAR 2000c, p.3). This conditional apology does not belong to a substantial 
reconciliation process as it was not a genuine apology offered with no conditions that the 
offended shall forgive the offender (see Gaita 2000, p.286). Overall, the Australian 
Declaration towards Reconciliation was far removed from what Indigenous leaders had been 
advocating both before and during the reconciliation process.  
 
In addition to the Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation, CAR presented the 
Roadmap for Reconciliation at Corroboree 2000. This Roadmap for Reconciliation outlined 
four national strategies ‘identifying ways governments, community groups, organisations and 
individuals can implement the principles of the Declaration to help improve the lives of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and achieve reconciliation’ (CAR 2000a, p.71). 
These strategies were: the National Strategy to Sustain the Reconciliation Process, the 
National Strategy to Promote Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Rights, 
the National Strategy to Overcome Disadvantage and the National Strategy for Economic 
Independence. As with the Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation, the Roadmap for 
Reconciliation failed to address many of the Indigenous rights, including a treaty and 
sovereignty, that Indigenous leaders had long been advocating, both from within and from 
outside the formal reconciliation process. For example, the National Strategy to Promote 
Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Rights failed to articulate many 
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Indigenous rights, including sovereignty and a treaty (CAR 2000b, p.3). The National 
Strategy to Overcome Disadvantage focussed on socio-economic conditions, such as health, 
education and employment, instead of looking at broader issues of reparative justice such as 
sovereignty and a treaty (CAR 2000b, p.5). 
 
Following Corroboree 2000, a number of Indigenous leaders continued to campaign for 
Indigenous rights, in particular for a treaty. However, many in the wider community failed to 
see the connection between reconciliation and a treaty. Geoff Clark said he was ‘astonished’ 
when a senior journalist asked him, during Corroboree 2000, ‘when Aboriginal leaders had 
decided to place negotiation of a treaty on the reconciliation agenda’ (Clark 2000b, p.13). 
Clark argued that the ‘negotiation of a treaty has never been off our agenda’ and that the 
reconciliation process was imposed upon Indigenous people by former Prime Minister 
Hawke in response to Indigenous demands for a treaty (Clark 2000b, p.13). Clark wrote, ‘true 
reconciliation means recognising we possess distinct rights. They arise from our status as first 
peoples … a commitment from the government to negotiate a treaty is essential’ (Clark 
2000c, p.8). Clark contended that the significant public support for reconciliation shown 
during Corroboree 2000 illustrated the wider community wanted a ‘new deal’ for Indigenous 
people, including a treaty, and was the ‘mandate’ that Howard claimed he needed in order to 
negotiate a treaty (Clark 2000b, p.13). 
 
On June 5 2000, a number of Indigenous leaders, including Pat Dodson, Geoff Clark, Noel 
Pearson, David Ross, Ray Robinson, Gary Foley, Peter Yu, Marcia Langton, Michael 
Mansell and Charles Perkins, unanimously agreed to continue lobbying for a treaty (Mitchell 
2000, p.2). Clark stated ‘the meeting has decided that we need to come out with a formal 
agreement with government to resolve all the unfinished business in this country’ (cited in 
Mitchell 2000, p.2). 
 
These calls for a treaty received some support from the wider community. Former Prime 
Minister Malcolm Fraser contended a treaty could be useful ‘if it helped clear up 
misunderstandings’ (cited in Saunders et al. 2000, p.4). The Labor Federal Opposition and 
the Australian Democrats indicated they would consider a treaty (Saunders et al. 2000, p.4; 
Jopson & Metherell 2000, p.7). The Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Australian 
Council for Social Services issued a joint statement that ‘called for “real leadership” to bring 
such a document into fruition [because] “it’s time for a treaty”’ (cited in Saunders et al. 2000, 
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p.4). Ronald Wilson, the co-author of the ‘Bringing them Home’ report into the stolen 
generations, also supported a treaty (Taylor 2000, p.10). Bryan Keon-Cohen, a prominent 
lawyer, wrote a treaty would not be a ‘radical concept’, many other nations have treaties and 
the Aboriginal Treaty Committee ‘laid the groundwork’ for a treaty back in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (Keon-Cohen 2000, p.17). 
 
However, there was though substantial opposition to these calls for a treaty. This opposition 
predominantly came from some members of CAR and the Howard Government. The 
leadership of CAR both disputed the claims of many Indigenous leaders that the public 
support shown during Corroboree 2000 was a mandate for a treaty and argued that demands 
for a treaty would ‘derail’ reconciliation (Saunders & Rintoul 2000, p.1; Huggins 2000, p.11). 
Evelyn Scott, the Chairperson of CAR, claimed discussion of a treaty at this time would ‘hurt 
rather than help take us forward’ and further education was required (Saunders & Rintoul 
2000, p.1; Scott 2000a, p.15). Scott attacked the Indigenous leaders advocating a treaty, 
stating ‘who made them leaders? No one has made them leaders’ (Nason 2000a, p.1). 
However, Scott herself was appointed by the Howard Government to be Chairperson of 
CAR. As well, one of those leaders she criticised was Geoff Clark, who was the first person 
to be elected the Chairperson of ATSIC. Scott illustrated that she viewed reconciliation and a 
treaty as separate issues when she contended, ‘the treaty will not be advocated in the 
council’s final report (to parliament in December) because we are talking about reconciliation 
in Australia’ (Nason 2000a, p.4). Gustav Nossal, the Deputy Chairperson of CAR, stated the 
issue was ‘divisive’ and could damage the support for reconciliation gained at Corroboree 
2000 (Saunders & Rintoul 2000, p.1). Another CAR member, Jackie Huggins, wrote that 
while she supported discussions on a treaty, Corroboree 2000 did not provide a mandate for 
this ‘highly emotive’ issue and there was a ‘need for wide community education and 
awareness, so that these issues [a treaty and Indigenous parliamentary representation] cannot 
be turned into divisive diversions’ (Huggins 2000, p.11). Gatjil Djerrkura, a former 
Chairperson of ATSIC, similarly advocated the push for a treaty could damage reconciliation 
and that ‘a treaty should not be rushed’ (cited in Balogh 2000, p.2). Ray Martin, another 
member of CAR, criticised the campaign for a treaty and promoted a nationalist line by 
stating that the wider community would not accept ‘the idea of special rights or privileges’ 
(cited in Nason 2000a, p.4). 
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The Howard Government likewise strongly rejected the campaign for a treaty. This approach 
was consistent with the Howard Government’s strong opposition to Indigenous rights, 
including self-determination and native title. Howard described the demands for a treaty as 
‘very divisive’ (cited in Saunders & Nason 2000, p.1). Howard argued, ‘a nation, an 
undivided nation, does not make a treaty with itself. I mean, to talk about one part of 
Australia making a treaty with another part is to accept that we are in effect two nations’ 
(cited in Wright & Taylor 2000, p.2). Saunders and Nason reported that Howard claimed that 
enacting a treaty could lead to ‘national separatism, land claims and litigation’ (Saunders & 
Nason 2000, p.1). 
 
In addition, the campaign for a treaty was rejected by other conservative political leaders 
around Australia. The Chief Minister of the Northern Territory, Denis Burke, claimed the 
‘Aboriginal industry’ was ‘hijacking’ the reconciliation process and that it was a ‘disgraceful’ 
attempt to create separate Indigenous states in northern Australia (cited in Nason & Saunders 
2000, p.4). The Premier of Western Australia, Richard Court, expressed similar concerns, 
stating that ‘we don’t need a treaty, we are one country. A treaty has the real potential to 
divide, not unite’ (cited in Nason & Saunders 2000, p.4).  
 
Some Labor premiers were ambivalent about a treaty. The Premier of Queensland, Peter 
Beattie, refused to commit to a treaty and stated his cabinet would discuss the issue ‘to see 
how it could be effected’ (cited in Nason & Saunders 2000, p.4). The Premier of Victoria, 
Steve Bracks, similarly did not commit to a treaty and simply stated his Government would 
‘examine the proposed treaty’ (cited in Nason & Saunders 2000, p.4). 
 
Another Indigenous right discussed at the May 25 meeting with Prime Minister Howard, 
namely addressing self-determination through reserving parliamentary seats for Indigenous 
people, received a similarly negative reaction from political leaders. Howard called the issue 
divisive and argued, ‘a large number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders would rather 
see themselves going into parliament as part of the Australian community rather than through 
some kind of special reservation of parliamentary seats’ (cited in Saunders 2000, p.2). The 
Labor Opposition federal leader, Kim Beazley, also disagreed with the idea and believed that 
increasing Indigenous parliamentary participation could be achieved in the ‘normal way’ by 
political parties encouraging more Indigenous candidates to run for election (cited in 
Saunders 2000, p.2). 
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These reactions by many in the wider community to the idea of Indigenous rights, such as a 
treaty and reserved Indigenous seats, were criticised by Pratt, Elder and Ellis: 
 
In so wholeheartedly and enthusiastically taking up the idea of reconciliation 
as the solution to the effects of colonial power relations between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous peoples, non-Indigenous peoples often slip quickly and 
unproblematically from solutions articulated by different Indigenous 
communities and representatives, to actions that often fail to adequately 
address them. Calls for a treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people, for example, are often sidelined by government agendas that seek to 
minimise any shift in power relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples (Pratt, Elder & Ellis 2001, pp. 135-136).  
 
On 7 December 2000, the final report from CAR, Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, was 
tabled in the Commonwealth Parliament. This report outlined the decade-long history of 
CAR and the formal reconciliation process. The report made six recommendations to the 
Commonwealth Parliament concerning the Documents for Reconciliation presented at 
Corroboree 2000. Of particular relevance to this paper were recommendation five that called 
on all Australian parliaments to recognize that reconciliation would be advanced through 
treaties or agreements and recommendation six that called on the Commonwealth parliament 
to pass legislation (CAR included draft legislation in their report) that would initiate a process 
to develop an agreement or a treaty (CAR 2000a, pp.105-106). Further, although not 
specifically mentioned in CAR’s final report, the draft legislation developed by CAR 
included ‘a requirement that the Prime Minister commence negotiations with ATSIC to 
develop a process by way of a treaty or an agreement to address the unresolved issues of 
reconciliation’ (Jonas 2001, p.198). Interestingly, this emphasis by CAR on a treaty in their 
final report, which was almost entirely lacking during their ten-year existence, was, according 
to former ATSIC Chairperson, Lowitja O’Donoghue, largely a result of the efforts of Geoff 
Clark, with the leadership of CAR, Evelyn Scott and Gus Nossal, opposing the reference to a 
treaty (Nason 2000b, p.5; see Nossal 2000, p.302). In discussing CAR’s final report, Scott 
illustrated her lukewarm view of a treaty, merely commentating that ‘we must have a 
conversation about these issues’ (Scott 2000b, p.13).  
 
In December 2000, CAR released four booklets that further detailed the national strategies 
contained in the Roadmap for Reconciliation. These booklets similarly failed to genuinely 
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address Indigenous rights. Overcoming Disadvantage contained over 100 separate actions but 
generally did not examine rights such as customary law, land rights, a treaty or self-
determination (CAR 2000d, pp.3-18). Achieving Economic Independence largely did not 
address alternative entry programs in education, affirmative action in employment or 
Indigenous rights to their land in accessing capital (CAR 2000e, pp.3-10). Recognising 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Rights excluded Indigenous sovereignty in its 
discussions on self-determination and argued some Indigenous rights could only be advanced 
‘over the longer term’ (CAR 2000f, pp.3, 14). Sustaining the Reconciliation Process 
recognised, to a limited extent, racism and inequality, yet predominantly focussed on 
education and symbolism, rather than on Indigenous rights such as a treaty (CAR 2000g, 
pp.5-8, 23-25).  
 
After a delay of almost two years from CAR’s December 2000 report, the Howard 
Government finally released their response to the report in September 2002. The response 
was entitled Commonwealth Government Response to the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation Final Report – Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge and outlined the 
Government’s approach to each of the six recommendations contained in CAR’s final report. 
The most relevant responses of the Government for this paper were those made in regard to 
the fifth and sixth recommendations. The Howard Government stated that while it supported 
some agreements, such as Indigenous Land Use Agreements on native title, it did not support 
the concept of a treaty because 
 
such a legally enforceable instrument, as between sovereign states would be 
divisive, would undermine the concept of a single Australian nation, would 
create legal uncertainty and future disputation and would not best harness the 
positive environment that now exists in reconciliation. In fact, such a process 
could threaten that environment (Commonwealth Government 2002, p.23). 
 
In this paper, I examined the 1991-2000 formal reconciliation process in Australia and the 
failure of this process and governments, particularly the Howard Government, to genuinely 
recognise Indigenous rights. This failure occurred despite numerous Indigenous leaders 
consistently advocating the need to recognise Indigenous rights, including sovereignty, self-
determination, a treaty, parliamentary representation, land rights and native title, throughout 
the reconciliation decade.  
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The recognition of Indigenous rights would significantly address one of the key elements of 
reconciliation – that of justice. However, the 1991-2000 process focussed on other elements 
of reconciliation, particularly peace, forgiveness and repentance. Subsequently, the 
reconciliation process, in failing to recognise Indigenous rights and in marginalising the 
notion of justice, did not achieve its overall aim of reconciling Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples by 2001 (see Gunstone 2009). 
 
For any future reconciliation process in Australia to have any chance of genuinely achieving 
a substantive reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, the 
reconciliation process must address the key element of justice by recognising those 
Indigenous rights that have been demanded by Indigenous leaders for decades. 
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